€™By Kipchumba Some, August 31st 2013.
Soon after coming to power in
2002, the Narc regime embarked on a massive purge of top officials in the
security and public sectors who worked under former President Moi. Dr Francis K
Sang who at the time held the critical post of the Director of Criminal
Investigation Department was demoted a month into the coming to power of Narc.
He was moved to what was deemed
to be a junior position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mandarins of
the new regime hoped that he would decline the less prestigious post and resign
from the civil service. But he stayed put.
In the first ever memoir by a
retired senior police officer, Sang narrates how he survived the bewildering
ethnically-motivated political machinations of the new regime to become the
first ever executive director of the Regional Centre on Small Arms, a
diplomatic post that he says he got by default. Here is the story as penned in
Dr Sang’s memoir, A Noble But Onerous Duty:
It was beyond my wildest
imagination as a trained career police officer that at one time in my long
professional tour of duty, I would become a diplomat, especially in my own
country.
Interestingly, my diplomatic
mission did not happen by design but almost certainly by default.
The journey towards my diplomatic
mission actually began in 2003 only one month after the new leadership of
President Kibaki effected wide ranging changes among holders of key security
offices in the country.
Small arms office
In the course of these changes, I
was transferred to establish a previously non-existent small arms office at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The new office was a British
Government-funded project to support the control of the proliferation of small
arms in the region.
Many people including my close
friends regarded this transfer from being the Director of CID to a new office
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a major demotion, especially considering
the status of my new post compared to the one I previously held. Â As Director
of CID, I had slightly over 2,500 officers under my command, with 22 different
sections headed by senior officers of different cadres at the headquarters and
similarly at provincial and district levels. To my amazement, upon reporting to
my new office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I learned that there was not
a single member of staff assigned to work with me, not even a secretary.
To make matters worse, no
administrative arrangements had been put in place to assist me in the
co-ordination and implementation of what were known as the Nairobi Declaration
and the Co-ordinated Agenda for Action. These were agreements pertaining to the
control of small arms and light weapons that had been approved at two regional
ministerial meetings held in 2000 and 2002 respectively. It was difficult for
me to figure out how to establish this new and amorphous office. I joked with my colleagues that I was just like
a general going to war without a single soldier to command. I had to use my
sixth sense, developed after many years of police service to achieve success
and overcome the challenges in the new environment.
The so-called “powers-that-be†who had
been the architects of my transfer from the mainstream police service, had been
misled to believe that I would decline the new position. I realised that some well-orchestrated scheme
had been hatched to frustrate me to resign from public service by declining the
new appointment.Â
It was indeed the humility and
resilience acquired over many years of public service that enabled me to
withstand the ordeals of my new job, as yet, undefined role as I walked about
in my new surroundings.
One of the most negative effects
of my removal from the police nominal roll was the loss of my payroll number.
The mere striking off of my name from Kenya Police Force nominal roll soon
after my transfer left my life hanging in the balance without a payroll number
for almost three years.
Throughout this period, I earned
a minimal salary on a voucher, just like a casual labourer, and no benefits.
The change of duties further affected my pension emoluments since the
government stopped remitting my entitlements to the Director of Pensions, as I
was no longer on the payroll.
Retirement age
Having attained the mandatory
retirement age in the later years of my career, I was forced to regularise my
pension entitlements by paying a huge amount of money in order to receive my 30
years pension from the government.
The new challenges were not
confined to me alone but also extended to members of my immediate family who
suffered the effects and eventual consequences of the changed circumstances.
These ordeals aside, I thank God
that my three children who were
 attending different
universities outside the country when my transfer was effected managed to
complete their education though with a lot of constraints.Â
The humiliation and frustration
in the new office went on for considerable period of time. Some of the indirect
frustrations came only a week after reporting to the new office at Foreign
Affairs One evening, after I arrived at my residence in Loresho, Nairobi, my
security officer handed me an open letter that was delivered at the gate by
officials of the Ministry of Works.Â
The letter addressed to me was
written by the Permanent Secretary who gave me two weeks’ notice to vacate my residence in order to create room for
the new Director of CID.
To the best of my knowledge at
the time, the residence in which my family lived was a privately-owned house
rented by the government for any senior civil servant and was not an
institutional house to be “inherited†by the successor of the Director of the Criminal
Investigation Department of the Kenya Police.
Official circles
Indeed, from the moment I read
the letter, it occurred to me that in certain official circles, I was no longer
regarded a senior enough civil servant to merit occupying a rented government
house.
At the back of my mind was the
realisation that all these frustrations and disappointments were schemes to
force me to resign from the new position.
To pre-empt these reprehensible
machinations, I approached the landlord, a Mr Samwel Mbova, and explained to
him the dilemma I was in.
He was a retired senior civil
servant under President Moi’s
administration.
In the course of our discussions,
I showed him the two weeks’ vacation
notice and, based on our mutual understanding, requested him to let me rent the
house.Â
Without hesitation, Mbova
understood the ill-motive behind the vacation notice and agreed to my proposal.
Within one week’s time, we had signed an
agreement for renting the house through his lawyer.
Based on the signed agreement,
the landlord wrote a letter to the Public Works authorities informing them that
he was no longer going to lease the house to the government since he had got
another tenant.
The new development caught the
officials at the Ministry of Public Works by surprise. Indeed, they had been convinced that I would
be thrown out of the house into the cold street with my family and belongings
when the evacuation notice elapsed. Seven years later I managed to buy the house
from the landlord and it is now my own property! Forceful eviction
Although I had managed to triumph
over the attempted forceful eviction, some of trials and tribulations including
having to work in a relatively hostile environment did not disappear
immediately.
 Most of the senior officers who
worked with me appeared uneasy whenever we had discussions over some issues.
 This kind of hostility and
mistrust was not only confined to the senior cadre but the junior staff as
well. The suspicions and hostility got worse when the officers learned that
prior to joining them I was not only a cop but Director of CID.Â
In some quarters, it was even
rumored that I was an undercover agent assigned by the Government to
investigate them. I felt rather besieged working as a lone ranger in the new
setup. It would not have been easy for me to get an office at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had it not been the intervention of the Director of
Administration, Amb Frank Isipila who went out of his way to ensure that I was
comfortable in my new environment.
He relocated one of the officers
to another space in order to create space for me. I recall that at one time my close friend.
The late Col (rtd) Jan Kamenju who was
the Director of Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) and Brigadier (rtd) Christopher Kuto
came to my office but could not get chairs to sit on, forcing me to borrow a
chair from the next office for them to feel comfortable.
Creating the Nairobi Secretariat
for the new small arms control body was a daunting task for anyone but I had to
do it as quickly as possible. This was partly due to the fact that he creation
of this office had failed to take off three years before I was posted to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The 10 signatory states of the
Nairobi Declaration on the Proliferation of Small Arms namely Burundi,
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda had entrusted the Kenya Government with the task of
creating the regional secretariat.
I got some encouragement,
however, upon realising that the staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had
changed their hearts and minds regarding my presence and the kind of work I was
undertaking.
In the course of taking over the
new office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs I observed that the Small Arms
file that was handed over to me was very unpopular with the staff in the
International Organisations and Conference (IOC) division, who had been
responsible, on an interim basis, for small arms issues.
Ultimately I could not blame them
because apart from other underlying factors, small arms were a rather strange
subject for them to deal with. With my law enforcement background, I was the
right man for the job, quite at home with the intricacies of small arms.
Another reason that made the
staff working in this section apprehensive about dealing with small arms file
was the strongly worded letters that were often sent by the development
partners questioning various aspects relating to the non-utilisation of grants
meant for the establishment of a fully-fledged Nairobi Secretariat. Â The
Nairobi Secretariat that I had taken over in 2003 when I moved to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs had been formed as an interim arrangement to coordinate
issues regarding small arms in the region after the signing of the Nairobi
Declaration in 2000.
 Member states had mandated the
Kenya government to set it up awaiting the establishment of a regional body
dealing with the issue of small arms.
The proposal to create the
Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) was conceived later following a meeting I
had with the Director of Political Affairs Thuita Mwangi and the head of Legal
Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Michael Kiboino in 2005.
Following the establishment of
RECSA, the 1ST Extra-Ordinary Meeting for the Council of Ministers Meeting took
place in Kampala, Uganda on April 25th, 2006
On the agenda of the meeting was
the appointment of the Executive Secretary for the newly established regional
body. This item was discussed at a
closed meeting in which the Council of Ministers unanimously appointed me as
the first Executive Secretary of RECSA on a four year contract that could be
renewed once.
In their own words, the
appointment was in recognition of the great contribution that I had made in the
creation of RECSA and the competence displayed in the discharge of my
responsibilities.
I realised later, however, that
this did not go down well back home. It came to my knowledge that before I
travelled to Uganda for the ministerial meeting, some “politically
correct†candidates had already been lined up
for the post.
 Some of those who had been
lined up were senior and retired military officers who had been frequenting the
offices of influential Cabinet Ministers in the new regime in their schemes to
get appointed.Â
The position of Executive
Secretary had become attractive as a result of the new diplomatic status RECSA
enjoyed, along with attractive benefit and good terms of service that came with
the position.
 Upon my return to Kenya from
Uganda, I found out that the resentment over my appointment was in top gear.
One influential Cabinet Minister went to extraordinary lengths to bar my
accession to the post and gave instructions that the appointment be reversed.
He appeared to be ignorant of the
fact that the authority for appointment rested solely with the Council of
Ministers from all the twelve member states. The Kenya Government could not
alone make any drastic decision to give preference to one of its own preferred
candidates without the consensus of others.
The agenda for the meeting had
also been circulated three months earlier by the RECSA secretariat to all
member States indicating that the appointment of the Executive Secretary was
one of the issues to be discussed at the meeting. Being convinced that my
country would support my candidature in consideration of my contribution made
in the transformation of the Nairobi Secretariat into the new entity, I was
confident of getting the post. Strangely,
in the comprehensive report written to the Foreign Affairs PS on the outcome of
the meeting in Kampala, nobody bothered to congratulate me on my appointment.
I came to learn later that senior
officials at the Ministry who would have written such a congratulatory letter
were apprehensive that the appointment might be reversed due to the undue
external influence of the powerful personalities in the new regime.  Some of them were overheard saying that as
officials of the former regime, we were spent force while they also wondered
how I could have been appointed to such a high profile position and yet “our time†was
over.
At one point, as the matter of my
appointment was being discussed, some officials at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs who were interested in my position enthusiastically joined the rumour
mill claiming that the position of the Executive Secretary for RECSA was a
diplomatic post that required an officer who has previously worked in a
diplomatic environment.Â
In my view, all this talk was rather
misplaced, based on misconceptions by some unprincipled characters who wanted
to reap where they had not sown.
These officers were short on
memory, conveniently forgetting that they were the same people who had
disassociated themselves from the issue of small arms claiming that such
matters were within the purview of law enforcement.
One voice of reason stopped the
impending diplomatic row that would have been precipitated by revision letter
to be written to my appointing authorities.
The arrival of a sober-minded
senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Office of the
President at Harambeee House saved the day. After listening to all the
arguments, the official advised the panel against any move to reverse the
decision made in Kampala by the Council of Ministers.
He informed the team that the
Government of Kenya was fully represented at the Kampala meeting by an
Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Danson Mungatana and was the head of
delegation and he never objected to my appointment.
He told them that the twelve
member States decision was based on the commitment I had shown in the creation
of the Nairobi Secretariat and the goodwill I had developed with other partner
states and donors.
Advised team
The senior official further
advised the team that if the Kenya Government acted contrary to his advice, the
position of the Executive Secretary of RECSA would be advertised in all the
twelve member States, followed by interviews to identify the most qualified
candidate for the position.
He advised them that Kenya would
most likely lose such a golden and rare opportunity given to the country on
trust. The panel was satisfied with the advice and put the matter to rest.
Interestingly, I got my congratulatory letter of appointment from the Foreign
Affairs PS immediately thereafter, three months after I was appointed to the
position. On appointment, I heaved a huge sigh of relief as I was able to
receive my first substantial payslip, thus stopping to earn my paltry salary on
payment vouchers.
This was because RECSA had then
become an autonomous body from the Kenya Government with its own rules of
engagement.
The terms of service in my new
appointment gave me a new lease of life and the hope that I had almost lost.
Upon attaining the mandatory previous retirement age of 55 years, I left the
public service but continued with RECSA until the end of the two terms contract
when I retired from the diplomatic position.
As fate would have it, I was to
become the fourth indigenous Kenyan Director of Criminal Investigation since
the department’s inception in 1926. When I was
appointed as the director of the Criminal Investigation Department in 1999, I
took over from Mr Noah arap Too who had been the longest serving CID boss since
Kenya attained independence in 1963.
Too served for 15 years while his
predecessor Mr Ignatius Nderi one decade. Prior to the CID appointment, I was
Senior Deputy Commissioner of Police 1, a rank below that of the then
Commissioner of Police Duncan Wachira. I was Mr Wachira’s
deputy for two years taking over from Mr Jackson Koskei who had proceeded on
retirement.
Some of the senior CID officers
doubted my ability to perform as the director and questioned my investigative
skills and experience, because I had not worked as a detective before. Indeed my appointment took many of them by
surprise because they had high expectations that they would be promoted to the
CID director post after Too’s
retirement.
The public likewise did not give
me a chance to settle in my new job as questions were asked about my capacity
to head the department.
The questions and doubts were
mostly based on the uninformed argument that as a uniformed officer I could not
step into the “big shoesâ€
of a professional detective like my predecessor. Ironically, Too happened to
have been a uniformed officer before he assumed this position.
Those critics ignored the fact
that I was once one of the directing staff at the Kenya Police Training
College, giving lectures on investigation, crime prevention and practical
police work for both junior and senior students attending courses. Equally,
they had over looked the fact that I had been an Officer Commanding Station
(OCS), Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) and the Provincial Police
Officer (PPO) of the largest province over a period of 26 years.
Nevertheless, without seeking to
blow my own trumpet regarding my ability to cope with the new challenges, I
bravely took over the post and introduced a new style of management. In press briefings, soon after taking over
the office, I informed the media and other people present of my strategic
approach to modernise the CID. I told
all those present to evaluate my performance upon the end of my “contract†as the
director of CID.
Despite the skepticism, I took
over and soon realised that the CID was experiencing internal structural and
staffing problems. These included human resource management deficiencies, poor
manpower planning, lack of succession management plans, promotional stagnation
of personnel, inadequate training and, above all, a very demotivated staff.
There was only one Deputy Commissioner of Police who was my immediate deputy
and 12 Senior Assistant Commissioners of Police. These officers were deployed
either as Provincial CID chiefs or Section heads at CID headquarters.
At the CID headquarters, there
were 22 specialised sections which provided technical support to the provinces
and divisions. At the core, the CID
employed about 2,500 police investigators spread around the country and more
than 500 civilian staff.
It became clear to me that
irrespective of efforts to achieve overall objectives of the department of
crime prevention and detection, this could not happen while I was working with
demoralised officers.
It became clear to me that a
major overhaul was needed in the department in order to be able to adapt to the
rapidly changing crime trends in the country.
Consequently, I wrote to the then
Commissioner of Police Philemon Abong’o
highlighting the problems that I faced in my new office. My main request to the Commissioner was for
his intervention to enable the department to fulfill its core function of crime
management and control.
In response to the request, the
Permanent Secretary and Director of Personnel Management appointed a team of
experts to conduct an operational analysis and manpower needs assessment of the
CID.
At the end of its work, the team
produced a report titled Revitalization and Strengthening of Criminal
Investigation Departments towards the end of 2000.
In the report, he team made far
reaching recommendations on how to revitalise and strengthen the CID.
It is important to note that
before appointment of the implementation committee of the report, a Strategic
Plan for the period 2000-2004 had been prepared through the concerted efforts
of CID staff.
Thus the CID was among the very
first departments of government to develop a Strategic Plan. The Kenya Police
Force developed its Strategic Plan in 2005 following a directive from
government requiring all its departments to develop such a plan.
Although the Strategic Plan and
the Policy Document on Revitalisation and Strengthening of the CID would have
been useful during the development of the Kenya Police Strategic Plan and
reform plans developed in later years, senior officers at the Police
headquarters chose to disregard these useful documents. They were shelved
because they were associated with officers who had worked in the regime of
President Moi. Change and adaptation of the department to the new crime situation
has been slow and hesitant mainly due to the resistance of those people, both
within and uoutside the police force who wish to maintain the status quo. When
I took over as director of CID, I had to take immediate action to address the
challenge of cybercrime. My reform agenda for the CID commenced with an audit
of all officers within the department in order to know who were computer
literate. To my immense surprise and disappointment, the outcome of the audit
was far worse than I had imagined.
There were very few officers that
had even basic capacity to investigate computer crimes. It was inconceivable
for a department like the CID with its investigatory mandate to lack such
capacity. As a longtime measure, we found it absolutely necessary to establish
an Information Communications Technology (ICT) section within the department.
At the time, ICT was still a very
grey area in the government. The private sector was far better equipped in
their technological operations.
The CID was therefore among the
first departments in the government to have embraced ICT in its work.
At that particular time, I recall
that judges were also undertaking some computer lessons in some of the training
schools.
The establishment of ICT section
was a good start and a major leap forward from the way things had been in the
past.
To further strengthen this
resolve to introduce the use of modern technology in the CID, I organised
computer training courses for all senior staff at Kenyan Institute of
Administration and University of Nairobi.
Good example
To set a good example for my
juniors, I hired a tutor to train me on how to use computers for an hour every
day. It was my greatest disappointment to learn that some years after my
departure from the CID, the Cybercrime Unit was disbanded.
The importance of putting up
mechanisms to deal with cybercrime on one hand and the need to deal with
challenges posed by armed violence on the other created the necessity to
establish specialised units to tackle the twin menaces.
My office, therefore, established
the Special Crime Prevention Unit (SPCU) upon realisation that the Flying
Squad, the only crack unit under the CID at the time that dealt with armed
robberies and car-jacking could not effectively tackle the rising cases of
armed violent crime.
While Flying Squad was confined
to Nairobi, the new unit would operate throughout the country. The unit
comprised of a rapid response team that could be called upon within a short
span of time in response to any emerging serious crime reported in the country.
The demand for the services of
this squad grew quickly. The SPCU was better structured than the Flying Squad.
It had, shortly after it came into existence managed to dismantle several
criminal syndicates and arrested notorious criminals.
Soon after the initial successes,
a specialised unit by the name of Track Unit was established.
The main reason for the reaction
of the unit was to address the issue of frequent loss of valuable evidence from
scenes of crime during investigations. Any evidence now had to receive a stamp
from the new unit during the pursuit of gangsters.
This unit worked closely with the
Criminal Intelligence Unit (CIU) as its main back-up in providing information
for their operational purposes.
Invaluable support
It was crucial for the CID to
maintain good working relationship with the National Security Intelligence
Service (NSIS) under the leadership of Brig Wilson Boinnet. The CID under my
stewardship managed to get invaluable support from the NSIS soon after I
restructured the CIU. The NSIS greatly helped the department in training the
newly recruited crime intelligence officers at the National Intelligence
Academy (NIA).
The first 60 officers to graduate
from NIA were deployed to work under the PCIOs in all the eight provinces in
the country.
In Kenya and probably elsewhere,
the Prosecution Section is usually an integral part of the CID. On taking over,
I found out that the section had its own share of problems and challenges.
There were 270 prosecutors ranging from the rank of Inspector to Senior
Superintendent deployed in 244 courts countrywide.
The general rule requires that
the police prosecutors should be of the rank of Inspector and above. Due to
shortage of personnel in the CID, however, it was common practice for officers
below the rank of inspector to carry out prosecution of cases in court. It was
obvious to me that some of these court prosecutors could not handle legal
arguments in court against eloquent, well-trained defence attorneys.
It became necessary, therefore,
for the department to train additional prosecutors in order to be effective.
One of the important branches at
CID headquarters is the Crime Reading Section which serves as the main source
of reference and as a think tank to advice the director on criminal cases
referred to the office either from the provinces or the other police
formations. As Director, I found it necessary to revamp this section because it
required officers with a legal background who could give informed legal advice.
To my astonishment, there was no officer with background in the CID who could
be engaged by the department to provide legal advice.
 Strengthen office
In view of the need to strengthen
this office, I sought authority from the Commissioner of Police to recruit two
practicing lawyers as Kenya Police Reservists. The two lawyers who became
reserve police officers were Mr Benson Musau and Mr Bernard Mbae. The
Integrated Ballistic Identification System (IBIS) has become the de facto
standard tool for law enforcement agencies around the world for sharing
ballistic data. Soon after my appointment, I found out that the department
still used traditional methods of firearms identification.
Three officers working in this
section, Mr Nduguga, Mr Lubanga and Mr Mugo, were the only firearms experts
whom the police force and the courts in the country depended on ballistics
matters.
Sadly, all the three officers
were due to proceed on retirement soon after I took over. There was a huge
backlog of cases in the ballistics section requiring examination which had
ultimately overwhelmed the three firearms examiners.
In endeavouring to resolve the
inherent problems, I asked for and received authority to purchase an automatic
ballistic identification machine from Canada. At that time, Kenya, South Africa
and Algeria were the only three countries in Africa that had acquired such a
machine. As a follow up on my efforts to strengthen the ballistic section, the
newly hired university graduates who had joined the department became a
necessity.
Anti-corruption unit
In September 2001, President Moi
ordered for the formation of the Anti-Corruption Unit to combat rampant graft
in the public and private sectors. The formation of the unit was precipitated
by the unexpected disbandment of Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority by the High
Court. This unit was administratively under the CID director. I was part of the
high level team that worked on the formation of the Anti-Corruption unit which
was to serve as a stop-gap measure to fill the gap left by the dissolution of
the previous body.
The anti-graft body came up with
laudable research strategies that proved useful to the government in its fight
against corruption. One of the admirable achievements came in 2002 with the
launch of the Public Service Integrity programme to operate under the Public
Officer Ethics Act.
With the re-establishment of an
independent body under the name of Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, ACPU was
disbanded.
The dream to build a forensic
laboratory was a matter that was pending when I took over from my predecessor
Too. The main reason for the establishment of this important facility was to
boost the capacity of the CID to conduct investigations using new technologies.
It became imperative for the CID to acquire Mazingira House as its new
headquarters due to the congestion on the two acre plot which accommodated the
old CID headquarters at that time.
By the time I was transferred
from the CID the construction of the new Mazingira Complex was almost complete
although I did not have the opportunity to sit in one of the offices. I am
nevertheless pleased that the CID is now able to serve the people of this great
country in a more spacious and conducive environment. When I took over,
promotions and job designations had been haphazard and most incomprehensible.
Job stagnation was a major cause of discontent among both police and civilian
personnel within the CID as promotion for a wide cross-section of officers was
almost non-existent.
General police duties
Contrary to expectation, a number
of officers would have preferred the general police duties to working at the CID
since opportunities were more promising.
This was rather strange to me
because since the early days of my career as a policeman, uniformed police
officers on general duties wished to work in the CID due to its good
reputation. Having taken some time to work out a succession strategy for the
CID, I was satisfied that things were moving smoothly.
In addition to the steps outlined
above that had been undertaken to enhance professionalism, I, however, felt
that there was need to inject a new crop of officers with a sound academic
background to the CID.
As a matter of procedure, I
sought authority from the Commissioner of Police for the CID to start
recruiting university graduates direct from the Kenya Police College Kiganjo
after they had completed their initial nine months training.
Pioneers of these programmes
included Dr John Mutonyi, who later became Assistant Director of KACC.
Among others who pursued similar
academic work but in different courses were Ms Grace Kahindi, Mrs Mary Awuor,
Mr Michael Jacobam, Mr Henry Gathogo, Mr Gideon Kimilu and Mr Maurice Amattta.
Beyond the parallel degree
programme undertaken by these officers I had started discussion with the
University of Nairobi administration regarding the need to credit courses
offered at the CID training school.
During my time, the wave of
positive change within the CID drew much apprehension from some senior officers
at police headquarters, partly because of the high public profile the
department was gaining.
Hostility against this branch of
the police force had the effect of reducing the well-known and vibrant
department to what many people described as being “just
like a crime branch within a police station.â
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